Predictions and promises monitor

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#Russia

Authors
339
Predictions
1956
Verified
753
Came true
63%
Complex
58%
Confident
48%

Fyodor Krasheninnikov

As of now, September 19, 2024, I still hold the opinion that there is a long way to go until the end of this war. And unless some kind of miracle happens, such as the sudden death of Vladimir Putin, the main organizer and inspirer of this war, it will most likely last for another year.
Expected September 19, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia #Putin
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

Many researchers suggest that Russia has a plan to move further towards the village of Velykyi Burluk... But by the end of summer, no, that's too far, it's beyond Russia's capabilities right now.
Expected September 15, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Russia #Ukraine
ru → en

Sergey Auslender

Launchers are in short supply for them, carriers are in short supply, so there aren't many missiles in their volleys, which is good. But the number of drones is growing more and more. And I'm afraid we'll see 1,000 before the end of summer, literally. The number increases every day there. And Ukrainians urgently need to work on this. By the end of summer, Russia will launch 1,000 drones at Ukraine in a single volley.
Expected September 15, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Yuri Fedorov

During this year's summer campaign, I'm not sure that Russian forces will be able to accomplish the tasks set before them and create any significant buffer zone 10–15–20 km deep and stretching along the entire border of the Sumy region — no, that's unlikely.
Expected September 15, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ilia Novikov

TCC, in Russian, is a military enlistment office... My prediction is they'll try to play with this for a while, then they'll run out of military enlistment offices that can be hit by drones. Using a large missile or several missiles to completely destroy a military enlistment office is a rather unprofitable project. And in a month or two, we won't hear about these targeted attacks on military enlistment offices anymore. In a month or two, Russia will stop targeted attacks on Ukraine's TCCs.
Expected September 8, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Alfred Koch

In 50 days... Siversk will not be taken, Serebryanka will not be taken, Kupyansk will not be taken, Borova will not be taken, they will not reach Zaporizhzhia. Russian forces.
Expected September 5, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Russia #Ukraine
ru → en

Mykhailo Samus

I think that unfortunately, Putin will still manage to hold on until September, and Congress won't start considering that very hellish sanctions package or the 500% tariffs on Russian oil. Referring to the Lindsey Graham bill.
Expected August 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Russia #USA
ru → en

Pavel Schelin

There will be no ceasefire. A ceasefire is an extremely unrealistic scenario, because the conditions that Russia sets for it are, in fact, a de facto capitulation of Ukraine.
Expected August 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

Specifically regarding this footage, it was clearly a case of running in, snapping a photo, and running back — in other words, not a real foothold in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. But it’s clear that in the coming months, the Russian army will definitely cross that border. A border crossing is clearly expected this summer.
Expected August 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Andrey Piontkovsky

Europe is making some plans to build an army by 2028–2029. But there will be no 2028–2029. Everything will be decided in the summer of 2025. Either Ukraine will be broken and Europe will be left helpless and defenseless in the face of Russian aggression, or the situation will turn 180 degrees through massive arms supplies and the deployment of its own troops and pilots — and then a political crisis will emerge in Moscow.
Expected August 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Sergey Aleksashenko

I think we can confidently predict that at the next meeting the rate will also remain unchanged, and this will continue until the end of the summer — I believe until around August. The Central Bank of Russia will not change the key rate until the end of summer.
Expected August 31, 2025
#Economy of Russia #Russia #Economy
ru → en

Mikhail Svetov

Unfortunately, it must be stated that the war will continue despite the temporary truce introduced by Vladimir Putin. In honor of Easter, he announced a unilateral ceasefire. Since then, the temporary ceasefire has been violated. Putin has already stated that the ceasefire will not be extended. Unfortunately, Trump’s peace plan has failed.
Expected August 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia #Trump
ru → en

Gennady Gudkov

They are unfeasible. There will be no peace. All serious politicians in Europe already understand that. In response to the question: "The U.S. proposed that Europe ease sanctions against Russia in the event of a peaceful settlement in Ukraine. The U.S. also believes that the territories Russia captured during the war should remain under Moscow’s control. These proposals have been voiced. Bloomberg reports on this. How feasible are they?"
Expected August 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Yevgeny Kiselyov

For some reason, I don’t believe that Trump’s lost patience will necessarily turn into a flow of weapons suddenly pouring from across the ocean into Europe and then into Ukraine. And I also find it hard to believe that he’ll impose any “from-hell” sanctions against Putin. It seems to me that he’ll simply lose interest in this recently obsessive idea of his — to achieve a ceasefire on the Ukrainian front as quickly as possible. I think he’ll just throw up his hands and walk away.
Expected August 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Trump #Putin #Russia #USA #Ukraine
ru → en

Sergey Grabskiy

Therefore, it's not appropriate to say that we are seriously considering the possibility of an offensive in the Sumy or Kharkiv direction today or in the near future. Speaking about a potential Russian offensive.
Expected August 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Stepan Demura

Unfortunately, the war will continue. It seems that now there will be a war. Not a special military operation, but a war in the true sense.
Expected August 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Maksim Shevchenko

Since it has the nature of a behind-the-scenes financial and economic deal, Kirill Dmitriev is a key figure here. So, without a doubt, this deal will go through. Calling it “peace talks” doesn’t feel right. I believe it will be a situation that Trump will sell as his victory — and after that, the war will resume. In response to the question: “Do you think peace negotiations will reach their logical conclusion, or will everything continue indefinitely?”
Expected August 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia #USA
ru → en

Oleksiy Arestovych

Remember this tweet. It contains the rules and outlines of the new world. Everything stated below has already been decided and will be announced soon. A Ukraine Reconstruction Fund will be established, with the U.S., Russia, and China as its shareholders. The initial capital will consist of $40 billion from the U.S., $40 billion from Russia, and $20 billion from China. Later, this Fund will absorb $350 billion from Russia (frozen assets), while the U.S. considers that it has already contributed $350 billion (this is the exact figure Trump mentioned). But that’s not all. Over time, the U.S. will contribute another $350 billion, China—around $200 billion, along with additional contributions from the royal dynasties of the Persian Gulf. The total size of the Fund is expected to reach $1 trillion.
Expected August 31, 2025
#Ukraine #USA #Russia #China #War in Ukraine
ru → en

Andrey Buzarov

As for the possible end of the war, I have a very clear position on this issue—as an expert, as a political scientist, a scholar in the field of political science. I see no prerequisites whatsoever, absolutely none, in any format, that would indicate a trend toward ending the war. The war in Ukraine.
Expected August 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Igor Strelkov

We suffered a diplomatic defeat even before the negotiations began—that's a fact. As for what this will lead to, whether the war will continue or not—I have my own particular opinion on this, which I have already expressed. I believe that at the very least, there will still be a spring-summer campaign, and the fighting will continue. After that, we’ll see.
Expected August 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Vladislav Zhukovsky

There will be no reduction to 15%, as Aksakov claims, by spring or summer—it definitely won’t happen. This scenario is practically out of the question. Speaking about Russia’s key interest rate in 2025.
Expected August 31, 2025
#Economy of Russia #Russia #Economy
ru → en

Michael Nacke

I think the surprise over North Koreans participating in the war and being used in combat roles will, by the middle of next year, become quite a common story. In other words, we’ll be watching plenty of videos of FPV drones taking down North Koreans.
Expected August 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #North Korea #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Vladimir Pastukhov

Most likely, if the negotiations continue at this pace for just a bit longer, two events await us: a large-scale spring-summer Russian offensive on the front lines, and the simultaneous disappearance of America from the picture.
Expected August 30, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia #USA
ru → en

Vyacheslav Shiryaev

There is no deal with Trump and there won't be one. I don't expect any new visits from Witkoff to Moscow in the near future; there definitely won't be any.
Expected August 26, 2025
#Russia #USA
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

We believe that within a month, a month and a half, or two at most, Russian troops will most likely be able to reach the settlements of Khoten, Pisarevka, and Yunakovka, and will most likely stop there, not advancing any further.
Expected August 17, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Evgeny Kogan

Here are a bunch of factors why the ruble is strong. In my opinion, this situation is temporary. There will be a reversal. I think when the rate is cut again by 100 basis points in July, by around August, the ruble will gradually start to weaken.
Expected August 15, 2025
#Ruble #Economy of Russia #Economy #Russia
ru → en

Sergei Markov

In Azerbaijan, all five detained employees of Sputnik Azerbaijan have been released on their own recognizance. Excellent news! Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan have gradually started to emerge from the crisis. My forecast: relations will normalize not rapidly, but quite quickly. However, only citizens of Azerbaijan have been released so far, while Russian citizens remain under arrest.
Expected August 3, 2025
#Russia #Azerbaijan
ru → en

Ian Matveev

It's obvious Putin doesn't want to apologize at a high level. They're both dictators, both have taken hostages and beaten them, which is, of course, terrible. In Azerbaijan, they grabbed some completely random Russian guys—one's an IT specialist, another something else—and they've all been identified. They're not drug dealers or anything. These are the ways of things: two dictators taking hostages. Maybe there will be exchanges. I think it will all somehow resolve within a month. I hope the people will be free.
Expected August 3, 2025
#Russia #Azerbaijan
ru → en

Alexey Naumov

I predict that Donald Trump will hold off on imposing sanctions for now — Ukraine’s attack on the aircraft will give him a reason to claim that neither side wants peace. Sanctions against Russia
Expected July 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Russia #Trump #USA #Economy
ru → en

Vladimir Osechkin

I believe that within a matter of weeks, Trump will lose the last of his illusions that any kind of agreement is possible. I don’t think he will make a fool of himself in front of the entire world. I expect that in the coming weeks, he will shift to much more serious rhetoric, and we will see new sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation — not symbolic ones, but measures that will strike hard at Putin’s wartime mobilized economy.
Expected July 31, 2025
#Trump #Putin #Russia #USA #Economy #War in Ukraine
ru → en

Gennady Medetsky

What we’re seeing now makes it absolutely clear that there will be no quick truce, no 30-day pause like some were expecting from this deal on Ukraine. And there’s one simple reason for that: the advantage Russia currently holds on the front lines — that’s undeniable, everyone knows it — is practically Putin’s only trump card in the negotiations.
Expected July 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Oleksiy Arestovych

75 to 25. A 75% chance that the campaign will continue, the war will go on; and a 25% chance that Trump will achieve some sort of truce. In response to the question: "If nothing changes, what problems are we facing this summer?"
Expected July 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Natalia Evdokimova

I think they’ll agree that they will jointly develop the areas near or around the Arctic Ocean. That’s most likely how it will end — with a mutually beneficial deal. Regarding the ongoing negotiations between Russia and the U.S.
Expected July 31, 2025
#Russia #USA
ru → en

Bogdan Bakaleyko

And then we’ll return to our familiar 95–100. The Finance Ministry knows better how far to devalue the ruble to make the budget work. But obviously, that will definitely happen. There’s no avoiding it.
Expected July 31, 2025
#Ruble #Dollar #Economy #Economy of Russia #Russia
ru → en

Dmitry Demushkin

Someday, the hot phase of the conflict will come to an end. The sides are currently engaged in a war of attrition. But I don’t really believe in the signing of any peace agreement right now — because the interests of the parties are diametrically opposed.
Expected July 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Vladimir Milov

This cannot go on for long. After a while, it will become obvious that peace is impossible. That Trump has only provoked Putin, making him more brazen and less willing to negotiate. Somehow, this bubble will burst. I fear it will happen in an unpleasant and rather loud manner.
Expected July 31, 2025
#Trump #Putin #USA #Russia #War in Ukraine
ru → en

Vladimir Milov

The only tool that could work in this situation is pressure on Putin. It's already clear after two months that Trump refuses to apply it. And he won’t. He will not apply it. It’s already possible to conclude that Trump does not want to put any pressure on Putin.
Expected July 31, 2025
#Trump #Putin #USA #Russia #War in Ukraine
ru → en

Ian Matveev

I’m more inclined to believe the second scenario—that Putin will come up with excuses and reasons not to agree. In the end, he will not go for a truce.
Expected July 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia #Putin
ru → en

Alfred Koch

I think so. If we’re talking about a simple ceasefire without any conditions, then it can be agreed upon. In response to the question: "Will it be possible to achieve a ceasefire in the coming months?"
Expected July 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ian Matveev

In the next six months, yes. 100%. That’s my prediction. In the coming six months, the Russian army will definitely not capture Pokrovsk. In response to the question: "Will Ukraine be able to defend Pokrovsk?"
Expected July 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Abbas Gallyamov

I consider the negotiation track to be key, maybe not in the short term—over the next week or even months—but over a relatively longer period, like six months. Overall, the resources of both sides, in Russia and Ukraine, are significantly depleted.
Expected July 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Sergei Markov

The failure of peace negotiations and Trump’s sanctions against Russia, even if symbolic, mean that Russia will launch a military offensive. It can be assumed that during the peace talks mediated by Trump’s team, Russia had committed not to start a major offensive. If those commitments are no longer in place, the offensive begins. Apparently, that’s what will happen in the near future.
Expected July 29, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Russia #Ukraine
ru → en

Igor Lipsitz

The ice is thin, but the Central Bank will lower the rate anyway—it seems they've decided there's no point in protecting Russians from inflation.
Expected July 25, 2025
#Economy of Russia #Economy #Russia
ru → en

Igor Lipsitz

You're looking at such a long horizon for the interest rate, it's very difficult. The world is so turbulent that even a month is a long time. I think, most likely, they will keep the rate unchanged and say they will continue to monitor the trend of slowing inflation, but the Central Bank is ready to raise the rate if inflationary pressure in the Russian economy intensifies again. This is roughly the scenario I expect. In response to the question: "I understand it's still quite early to make predictions about the next Central Bank meeting, but if the decision is made based on behind-the-scenes situations, intrigues, internal power struggles, what forecast would you make for the next meeting on July 25? What will they do with the rate? Will they keep lowering it?"
Expected July 25, 2025
#Economy of Russia #Economy #Russia
ru → en

Sergei Markov

Trump promised to announce a surprise for Russia on Monday, July 14th. Everyone's guessing what it could be. My opinion is that Trump will issue a soft ultimatum: If Russia doesn't make concessions, a harsh sanctions law will be passed: a 500% trade tariff for countries that trade with Russia and don't pay "tribute" to Ukraine. And a partial lifting of sanctions if Russia makes concessions. But of course, no one can accurately predict Trump. Not even he himself.
Expected July 15, 2025
#USA #Russia #Trump #War in Ukraine
ru → en

Michael Sheitelman

They are trying to scare us by saying there will be no sanctions, look, Hungary and Slovakia have blocked new sanctions. Well, let me give you a forecast: another week or two, 1-2 weeks, and there will already be the 18th package of sanctions. That is my simple forecast. 18th package of sanctions against Russia
Expected July 15, 2025
#Economy of Russia #Economy #Russia #European Union
ru → en

Dmitry Oreshkin

It seems that within the coming months, a rotten compromise will be reached, which will please neither side... but it is far better than senseless and merciless bloodshed. Speaking about the war in Ukraine.
Expected July 15, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ekaterina Kotrikadze

I think Trump will announce sanctions tomorrow, but they won't be the kind Lindsey Graham is proposing. I believe Graham's suggested sanctions – 500% tariffs against Russia's trade partners – are too extreme; I don't think that will happen. I don't believe Trump will go that far. I think the sanctions will be different, much less painful, but still a significant blow to Russia.
Expected July 14, 2025
#USA #Russia #Trump #War in Ukraine #Economy of Russia
ru → en

Andrey Piontkovsky

Eighty-eight senators are co-authors of the resolution demanding harsh secondary sanctions and 500% tariffs against buyers of Russian oil... Senator Wicker stated that Trump asked the Senate to hold off until the end of this week. So this issue should be resolved next week. And after yesterday’s statements by Thune and Jackson, I have no doubt that the resolution will be adopted.
Expected June 30, 2025
#USA #Russia #Economy #War in Ukraine
ru → en

Dmitriy Potapenko

To answer your question, the rate will be raised to 23-25%, but it will be raised a bit later because you can’t spoil the timing. Referring to the key interest rate in Russia.
Expected June 30, 2025
#Economy of Russia #Russia #Economy
ru → en

Alexei Venediktov

I lean towards the idea that substantive negotiations on a ceasefire will begin. As for how they will end, as Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin once said: "That’s a philosophical question." In response to the question: "Do you believe that within the next six months there will be a truce, a ceasefire, or that Putin won’t agree to it?"
Expected June 30, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en