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Ruslan Leviev

Founder of Conflict Intelligence Team (Russia)

Predictions
97
Verified
50
Came true
92%
Complex
58%
Confident
38%
Rating
7.75
All Expected Expected soon New results

Ruslan Leviev

I think that even if it’s simply Putin’s natural death and, as a result, his personal power disappears, but one of his supporters comes to power, he will still be just a little better than Putin — that’s how it seems to me. Why? Because Russia will somehow need to be rebuilt economically, and for that, it will be necessary to get out from under the sanctions... In response to the question: "After Putin's death, will someone just like him take over, or someone more reasonable?"
Expected
#Russia #Putin
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

Many say that the Taurus missiles have a range of 500 km. But I am absolutely sure that even if Merz manages to get the Bundestag’s approval for supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine, they will deliver a special limited version with a range of no more than 300 km, because there is an agreement between states that missiles with a range over 300 km cannot be supplied to anyone.
Expected
#War in Ukraine #Germany #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

In any case, they will not appear in Ukraine until a full agreement to freeze the war is signed. Only after that can a peacekeeping contingent be deployed on Ukrainian territory.
Expected
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

What is meant by defeat? It’s Russia achieving its political goal, namely installing a puppet government in Kyiv... This is no longer achievable—neither with weapons nor with soldiers.
Expected
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

For now, these prospects are still elusive; they are more likely to be relevant in the post-war period. Not during a time when the war is frozen, but when it is fully over and all territorial disputes are resolved. Until that point, Ukraine's entry into NATO is clearly not going to happen.
Expected
#Ukraine #NATO
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

It’s clear that the Sarmat missile won’t be used in the current war in any way. It’s more about boosting the prestige of the Russian army, specifically Putin. Putin used to love threatening with these Sarmats, showing cartoons of them hitting Florida with their missiles. And now we’re seeing these technical problems, with the missiles blowing up again and again.
Expected
#War in Ukraine #Russia #Ukraine #Putin
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

It’s clear to me that, even though the issue with the aid legislation in America and Europe has been resolved, at some point Chasiv Yar will be captured. When that will happen is hard to predict. By Russian forces.
Expected
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

I am confident that in order for Ukraine to fully join the European Union, it will have to ratify the Rome Statute without any reservations. As long as this reservation remains, Ukraine will not find itself in the European Union.
Expected
#Ukraine #European Union
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

No, it will not... We are talking about lifting restrictions on the use of Western weapons. Let's assume all restrictions have been lifted and the necessary number of ATACMS have been supplied. They will start striking airfields, ammunition depots, logistics, and railway bridges. This will have an effect, but it will not be a turning point. Answer to the question: "If the Armed Forces of Ukraine strike deep into Russia, will this be a turning point in the war?"
Expected
#War in Ukraine #Russia #Ukraine
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

We do not expect that Ukrainian drones will ever start attacking targets in Moscow... clearly, they will not be able to kill anyone from the high-ranking leadership of Russia.
Expected
#War in Ukraine #Russia #Ukraine
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

As soon as the Putin regime truly collapses... I think there will be a domino effect, yes, at the very least, Lukashenko's regime will completely fall.
Expected
#Russia #Putin #Lukashenko #Belarus
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

Ukraine is currently in talks to purchase the MQ-9 Ripper drone. However, it is highly unlikely that such drones will be sold to them.
Expected
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

The capture of the entire Black Sea coast, meaning the capture of Odesa as well, is absolutely excluded. Russia will not be able to capture the Black Sea coast.
Expected
#War in Ukraine #Russia #Ukraine
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

Maybe I’ll stay here in New York forever, or maybe in 5, 10, or 15 years I’ll move somewhere else. But in about 15 years, I’m sure there will be a Russia one can return to.
Expected December 31, 2040
#Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

If we're talking about the military option—regaining any territories—then we're looking at a timeline of at least a notional 10 years, in my opinion. In response to the question: "Your most optimistic military forecast for Ukraine? Is there any chance of ever regaining any territories by military means?"
Expected April 2, 2035
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

Most likely, this will remain a mystery for many years and decades. Who blew up the Nord Streams.
Expected December 31, 2033
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

Kharkiv, in general, is not threatened by ground combat operations in the coming years. Yes, it has been, is, and will remain under shelling. Missiles, Shaheds, and artillery shells will keep hitting there. But as for actual ground fighting — no, Kharkiv is not facing that in the near future.
Expected December 31, 2026
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

Actually, it has been destroyed... This warehouse will definitely not be suitable for its intended use in the next year or two. About the recently destroyed ammunition warehouse in the Tver region.
Expected September 22, 2026
#War in Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

While I don't have the gift of prophecy, I can tell you that if the war isn't frozen, they will capture less territory next spring than they will next summer. This is a recurring trend. They always capture more territory in the summer than they do in the spring.
Expected August 31, 2026
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

In a format similar to the summer of 2023, something more or less large-scale — no, it’s not possible. There are neither the forces nor the resources for that. Right now, those forces and resources are only sufficient to defend, hold positions, and carry out diversionary raids. A full-scale counteroffensive is definitely not possible within the next year. Answer to the question: "Is a new counteroffensive by the Armed Forces of Ukraine possible?"
Expected April 2, 2026
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

I am 100% sure that Russia will deliberately provoke European countries with these seemingly accidental incursions. It won't be every week, but once a month or once every two months, hypothetically. I doubt one will be shot down eventually; as long as it flies on a tangent—just cutting the corner—they won't shoot it down. If they fly deep inside, then that's a different matter. In response to the question: "How likely is it that Russia will also troll the Europeans with its planes? And how likely is it that sooner or later one of these planes will be shot down?"
Expected March 25, 2026
#War in Ukraine #European Union #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

Many are asking questions about the Russian IT specialists who were beaten and detained in Azerbaijan. I think nothing will change in their situation right now.
Expected January 10, 2026
#Russia #Azerbaijan
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

I believe it is zero. I don't see any such chances for a freeze in the war. There are two and a half months left until the New Year. No, I consider it impossible. Answer to the question: "What do you think is the chance of the war ending before the New Year?"
Expected December 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

It’s very important not to repeat Putin’s mistake. Apparently, Putin believes he is winning and that a moment may come when the Ukrainian army is completely exhausted, the front collapses, the army retreats, and nothing is left of it. He believes he can seize that moment to capture significantly more territory and win the war. He’s waiting for that — he believes such a moment will come. We are confident that such a moment will not come. The current supply of ammunition and equipment is, more or less, sufficient for Ukraine to sustain the war at its present pace.
Expected December 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia #Putin
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

If Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka, key logistical hubs, are captured, it would pave the way toward Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, two major urban agglomerations in the Donetsk region. However, I doubt that the Russian army has any realistic chance of achieving this large-scale plan by the end of this year. These urban agglomerations cover a vast area, and fighting for them would take a long time.
Expected December 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

In the near future, Pavlohrad is not under threat of attacks, and neither is Dnipro. It’s very, very far away. Shahed strikes—yes, and missile strikes—yes as well, but as for ground attacks, we can speculate and discuss them in the context of 2026 or 2027, if the war is not frozen. For the next many months, a year, or probably even longer, it’s obvious—no, Pavlohrad is still far out of reach. Ground attacks by Russia on the Ukrainian city of Pavlohrad are unlikely to occur before 2026.
Expected December 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

I don’t think Ukraine really needs such systems right now, because it’s fairly obvious to me that we’re unlikely to see a second use of such missiles. Their military value is absolutely zero. Speaking about missiles from Russia’s "Oreshnik" system.
Expected December 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

I wouldn't expect that. Answer to the question: 'Are we threatened by a world war in the next two years? 2024-2025'
Expected December 31, 2025
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

I believe that the likelihood of the war being in some sense frozen, not finished but rather frozen, in 2025 is quite high.
Expected December 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Russia #Ukraine
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

It was quite obvious that Kamyshevakha would fall in the near future... Sooner or later, it will definitely end up in the Russian rear. That's pretty obvious.
Expected December 15, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

Technically, anything is possible... But there’s no strength for it, and it’s unclear why they would do it, so I don’t expect it. Still, we sometimes see illogical actions from the military. I give a half-percent chance that they’ll move along the border from Sumy region to Kyiv region — strictly along the border. That’s my forecast for this possible course of action by the Russian army. Answer to the question: “Could Russian troops move from Sumy region along the border toward Kyiv region?”
Expected December 11, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

And regarding the fact that many of the Z-supporters have started to rejoice "Finally, we're hitting the bridges, now we need to hit the bridges over the Dnieper River, for example, near the city of Zaporizhzhia". I believe this won't happen because there's very little point to it.
Expected December 4, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

It seems to me that judging by the pace, the attack on Kupyansk and the fighting for it are more likely to happen in the summer of this year, maybe even in the fall, something like that. Things are moving pretty slowly there.
Expected September 30, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

Most likely, closer to the end of summer, we will probably see the first full-fledged battles for the city of Pokrovsk itself.
Expected August 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

Specifically regarding this footage, it was clearly a case of running in, snapping a photo, and running back — in other words, not a real foothold in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. But it’s clear that in the coming months, the Russian army will definitely cross that border. A border crossing is clearly expected this summer.
Expected August 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

We believe that within a month, a month and a half, or two at most, Russian troops will most likely be able to reach the settlements of Khoten, Pisarevka, and Yunakovka, and will most likely stop there, not advancing any further.
Expected August 17, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

I expect that in the coming days there will be a retaliatory response from Russia to these attacks on airbases. It will be a massive aerial attack on Ukrainian cities.
Expected June 16, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en

Ruslan Leviev

I do not expect a large-scale attack toward Sumy. In response to the question: "Will Russia be able to advance toward Sumy if it pushes Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region?"
Expected May 31, 2025
#War in Ukraine #Ukraine #Russia
ru → en