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I believe it is zero. I don't see any such chances for a freeze in the war. There are two and a half months left until the New Year. No, I consider it impossible (Answer to the question: "What do you think is the chance of the war ending before the New Year?")

Many are asking questions about the Russian IT specialists who were beaten and detained in Azerbaijan. I think nothing will change in their situation right now

I am 100% sure that Russia will deliberately provoke European countries with these seemingly accidental incursions. It won't be every week, but once a month or once every two months, hypothetically. I doubt one will be shot down eventually; as long as it flies on a tangent—just cutting the corner—they won't shoot it down. If they fly deep inside, then that's a different matter (In response to the question: "How likely is it that Russia will also troll the Europeans with its planes? And how likely is it that sooner or later one of these planes will be shot down?")

It's obvious there will definitely be a battle for Pokrovsk this fall

While I don't have the gift of prophecy, I can tell you that if the war isn't frozen, they will capture less territory next spring than they will next summer. This is a recurring trend. They always capture more territory in the summer than they do in the spring

It was quite obvious that Kamyshevakha would fall in the near future... Sooner or later, it will definitely end up in the Russian rear. That's pretty obvious

Of course, I don't expect any major changes from the Trump administration in the next 2-3 weeks. We will again see comments from Putin, Trump... I expect that Trump will simply back out; this is my personal opinion, assessment, and forecast

I think the situation will unfold as follows. Today, I expect that even though the deadline has passed, Trump will most likely say something like, "Well, we did agree with the Russian side to arrange a meeting, and in doing so, we're signaling the end of the war, so why impose sanctions now?" That is what I expect will most likely happen

And regarding the fact that many of the Z-supporters have started to rejoice "Finally, we're hitting the bridges, now we need to hit the bridges over the Dnieper River, for example, near the city of Zaporizhzhia". I believe this won't happen because there's very little point to it

Most likely, closer to the end of summer, we will probably see the first full-fledged battles for the city of Pokrovsk itself

Many researchers suggest that Russia has a plan to move further towards the village of Velykyi Burluk... But by the end of summer, no, that's too far, it's beyond Russia's capabilities right now

It appears GTA 6 will be released earlier than the Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine is frozen

We believe that within a month, a month and a half, or two at most, Russian troops will most likely be able to reach the settlements of Khoten, Pisarevka, and Yunakovka, and will most likely stop there, not advancing any further

Technically, anything is possible... But there’s no strength for it, and it’s unclear why they would do it, so I don’t expect it. Still, we sometimes see illogical actions from the military. I give a half-percent chance that they’ll move along the border from Sumy region to Kyiv region — strictly along the border. That’s my forecast for this possible course of action by the Russian army (Answer to the question: “Could Russian troops move from Sumy region along the border toward Kyiv region?”)

I expect that in the coming days there will be a retaliatory response from Russia to these attacks on airbases. It will be a massive aerial attack on Ukrainian cities

Maybe I’ll stay here in New York forever, or maybe in 5, 10, or 15 years I’ll move somewhere else. But in about 15 years, I’m sure there will be a Russia one can return to

It’s very important not to repeat Putin’s mistake. Apparently, Putin believes he is winning and that a moment may come when the Ukrainian army is completely exhausted, the front collapses, the army retreats, and nothing is left of it. He believes he can seize that moment to capture significantly more territory and win the war. He’s waiting for that — he believes such a moment will come.

We are confident that such a moment will not come. The current supply of ammunition and equipment is, more or less, sufficient for Ukraine to sustain the war at its present pace

Specifically regarding this footage, it was clearly a case of running in, snapping a photo, and running back — in other words, not a real foothold in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. But it’s clear that in the coming months, the Russian army will definitely cross that border. A border crossing is clearly expected this summer

That's the situation with the truce. As you can see, it’s over, and now the shelling has resumed. I don't expect any strong reaction from the U.S. The Kremlin will now say, “Look, Ukraine is not capable of making agreements, it violated the truce.” Most likely, there won’t even be much of a reaction from the American administration. And that’s how this Easter truce came to an end

I think that even if it’s simply Putin’s natural death and, as a result, his personal power disappears, but one of his supporters comes to power, he will still be just a little better than Putin — that’s how it seems to me. Why? Because Russia will somehow need to be rebuilt economically, and for that, it will be necessary to get out from under the sanctions (In response to the question: "After Putin's death, will someone just like him take over, or someone more reasonable?")

Many say that the Taurus missiles have a range of 500 km. But I am absolutely sure that even if Merz manages to get the Bundestag’s approval for supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine, they will deliver a special limited version with a range of no more than 300 km, because there is an agreement between states that missiles with a range over 300 km cannot be supplied to anyone

Kharkiv, in general, is not threatened by ground combat operations in the coming years. Yes, it has been, is, and will remain under shelling. Missiles, Shaheds, and artillery shells will keep hitting there. But as for actual ground fighting — no, Kharkiv is not facing that in the near future

If they suddenly decide to launch a second wave of mobilization, I believe it won't happen (In Russia)

In any case, they will not appear in Ukraine until a full agreement to freeze the war is signed. Only after that can a peacekeeping contingent be deployed on Ukrainian territory

If we're talking about the military option—regaining any territories—then we're looking at a timeline of at least a notional 10 years, in my opinion (In response to the question: "Your most optimistic military forecast for Ukraine? Is there any chance of ever regaining any territories by military means?")

In a format similar to the summer of 2023, something more or less large-scale — no, it’s not possible. There are neither the forces nor the resources for that. Right now, those forces and resources are only sufficient to defend, hold positions, and carry out diversionary raids. A full-scale counteroffensive is definitely not possible within the next year (Answer to the question: "Is a new counteroffensive by the Armed Forces of Ukraine possible?")

It seems to me that judging by the pace, the attack on Kupyansk and the fighting for it are more likely to happen in the summer of this year, maybe even in the fall, something like that. Things are moving pretty slowly there

I do not expect a large-scale attack toward Sumy (In response to the question: "Will Russia be able to advance toward Sumy if it pushes Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region?")

If Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka, key logistical hubs, are captured, it would pave the way toward Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, two major urban agglomerations in the Donetsk region. However, I doubt that the Russian army has any realistic chance of achieving this large-scale plan by the end of this year. These urban agglomerations cover a vast area, and fighting for them would take a long time

In the near future, Pavlohrad is not under threat of attacks, and neither is Dnipro. It’s very, very far away. Shahed strikes—yes, and missile strikes—yes as well, but as for ground attacks, we can speculate and discuss them in the context of 2026 or 2027, if the war is not frozen. For the next many months, a year, or probably even longer, it’s obvious—no, Pavlohrad is still far out of reach (Ground attacks by Russia on the Ukrainian city of Pavlohrad are unlikely to occur before 2026)

If the war is not stopped next year, it’s clear that next year, Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad are likely to be captured

I don’t think Ukraine really needs such systems right now, because it’s fairly obvious to me that we’re unlikely to see a second use of such missiles. Their military value is absolutely zero (Speaking about missiles from Russia’s "Oreshnik" system)

What is meant by defeat? It’s Russia achieving its political goal, namely installing a puppet government in Kyiv... This is no longer achievable—neither with weapons nor with soldiers

Most likely, I assume that today, tomorrow, or the day after—in the next 3-4-5 days—there will be more strikes with ATACMS, Storm Shadow, and SCALP on some targets within Russian territory

We do not expect a collapse of the front (On Ukraine’s side)

For now, these prospects are still elusive; they are more likely to be relevant in the post-war period. Not during a time when the war is frozen, but when it is fully over and all territorial disputes are resolved. Until that point, Ukraine's entry into NATO is clearly not going to happen

So, I do not expect a Ukrainian counteroffensive next year

It’s clear that the Sarmat missile won’t be used in the current war in any way. It’s more about boosting the prestige of the Russian army, specifically Putin. Putin used to love threatening with these Sarmats, showing cartoons of them hitting Florida with their missiles. And now we’re seeing these technical problems, with the missiles blowing up again and again

Actually, it has been destroyed... This warehouse will definitely not be suitable for its intended use in the next year or two (About the recently destroyed ammunition warehouse in the Tver region)

Where will Russia reach by 2025?... To Sloviansk, I am sure, it definitely will not reach... I am making such cautious subjective predictions

Where will Russia reach by 2025? Uglidar will clearly not be held... I am making such cautious subjective predictions (Ukraine will not be able to retain Uglidar)

I am confident that in order for Ukraine to fully join the European Union, it will have to ratify the Rome Statute without any reservations. As long as this reservation remains, Ukraine will not find itself in the European Union

No, it will not... We are talking about lifting restrictions on the use of Western weapons. Let's assume all restrictions have been lifted and the necessary number of ATACMS have been supplied. They will start striking airfields, ammunition depots, logistics, and railway bridges. This will have an effect, but it will not be a turning point (Answer to the question: "If the Armed Forces of Ukraine strike deep into Russia, will this be a turning point in the war?")

I doubt that such a decision will be made in the near future. Only if the practice of Russian drones or missile incursions becomes more frequent, and random civilians are killed on European territory (The answer to the question: "Will the countries bordering Ukraine shoot down Russian missiles?")

I believe that the likelihood of the war being in some sense frozen, not finished but rather frozen, in 2025 is quite high

I doubt that they will be able to capture Pokrovsk by November. That would be too optimistic for the Russian army

Attacks on Lgov, the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant... on Kurchatov... in my opinion, this is complete nonsense. Clearly, this will not happen (The Armed Forces of Ukraine will not go to Lgov, Kurchatov, and the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant)

It’s clear to me that, even though the issue with the aid legislation in America and Europe has been resolved, at some point Chasiv Yar will be captured. When that will happen is hard to predict (By Russian forces)

I wouldn't expect that (Answer to the question: 'Are we threatened by a world war in the next two years? 2024-2025')

I do not expect that in the next month and a half, suddenly, the Russian side will stop the attacks due to the fact that the losses are too high (Attacks on Avdiivka)

Apparently, the Taurus missiles that can fly 500 km, if we see them at all, will not be anytime soon (These missiles are unlikely to be delivered to Ukraine anytime soon, if they are delivered at all)

Russia can bomb all the way to Lviv, which it periodically does. However, Ukraine is restricted, as if to say, "You can't go there." I believe we should come to a situation, and I think we will eventually, when this restriction will be lifted (Restriction on Ukraine's strikes on Russian territory using foreign weapons)

Considering all these remarks, I do not expect any other large-scale deliveries this year... the task of reaching Melitopol this year is unachievable, given all the difficulties (For the Armed Forces of Ukraine)

And most likely, after this, the grain deal will definitely come to an end

I find this absolutely impossible... What would be the point of entering the Kursk and Belgorod regions to occupy something there? If a mechanized offensive were to begin on Russian territory, the question of further support from Europe arises... Europe and America do not want to see ground combat on Russian territory (Response to the remark: "The Ukrainian counteroffensive may include entering the Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk regions")

Probably, in April-May, I would expect less from the Ukrainian side regarding any large-scale counteroffensive

I have no doubt that the war will not end in this calendar year

Most likely, this will remain a mystery for many years and decades (Who blew up the Nord Streams)

In this war, we do not see tank battles... Most likely, we will not see them

We do not expect that Ukrainian drones will ever start attacking targets in Moscow... clearly, they will not be able to kill anyone from the high-ranking leadership of Russia

Bakhmut itself is a large area. It won't be easy to capture it quickly. Therefore, I think we will be talking about Bakhmut for a long time, likely in the coming weeks

Of course. Undoubtedly. I am sure that such attacks will happen again. They may use different types of drones or missiles... In this regard, Russia is vulnerable, and it is possible to strike military facilities (Answer to the question: 'Can we expect to see such attacks in the near future?' (Drone attacks on military facilities in Russia, similar to the attack on the Engels airfield))

I do not expect that in the coming month Ukrainian forces will withdraw from Bakhmut

I haven't seen any objective factors supporting this version... it sounds quite doubtful (That Russia will leave the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in the near future)

As soon as the Putin regime truly collapses... I think there will be a domino effect, yes, at the very least, Lukashenko's regime will completely fall

I don't think they will now force the Dnieper to the left bank (Armed Forces of Ukraine)

Probably, we will not see the Ukrainian flag in Kherson in the next two weeks

I am absolutely sure that there will definitely be a second wave, maybe not in January, maybe later (The second wave of mobilization in Russia)

It is unlikely that it will be possible to cut off electricity entirely in Ukraine, that is, to arrange a blackout

We do not expect this at all... Russia will clearly not blow it up (The Kakhovka Dam)

We believe that they will most likely not provide anything (Israel will not give weapons to Ukraine)

I'm not sure that they will ever be provided at all (ATACMS missiles to Ukraine)

I think... they will clearly provide new air defense systems... but this will not allow for 100% coverage of the sky (Allies will provide air defense to Ukraine after the massive shelling of Ukraine on October 10)

I also don't think that Shoigu will be punished in any way for the failure with the Crimean Bridge

I don't think that if the Kherson region is liberated, they will immediately go for Crimea (Armed Forces of Ukraine)

It is likely that martial law will be introduced because of this... it can be declared in certain regions

And most likely, the shelling of Kharkiv will certainly not stop (About the shelling from Russia after the liberation of the main part of Kharkiv Oblast by Ukrainian forces)

We believe that at this point, Ukrainian forces will not advance further; they will not move into the Luhansk region (Further than the Oskol River)

One should not expect that Kherson will be liberated within a week or two or three. Most likely, it will be a lengthy process

Apparently, they will end up not completing anything and will have to use some kind of ferry crossing (About the restoration of the Antonivskyi Bridge over the Dnipro by the Russian occupation forces)

Ukrainian forces are likely to launch a large-scale counteroffensive in the fall

The capture of the entire Black Sea coast, meaning the capture of Odesa as well, is absolutely excluded (Russia will not be able to capture the Black Sea coast)

We believe that nothing will come of it (Commenting on the proposal by the Estonian Foreign Minister to ban the issuance of Schengen visas to Russians at the EU level)

We are currently stating in our reports that we are increasingly confident that even the Donetsk region will not be taken at any time

I would say it's quite a funny scenario (A scenario of a large-scale Russian offensive on Odessa in early 2023)

If those HIMARS that were promised actually start to be provided, then I think that in a month we will see a serious change in the situation

Today, Putin announced that we are canceling the assault on Azovstal. But naturally, the gunfire will not stop in any way. We are absolutely certain of this... bombs will continue to be dropped on Azovstal... there will be shelling from a distance

It is clear that nothing like that will happen (Talking about the Easter truce)

Russia will be able to fight for a month and a half to two months; it will not withstand heavy fighting for longer... then partial mobilization will be required

Ukraine is currently in talks to purchase the MQ-9 Ripper drone. However, it is highly unlikely that such drones will be sold to them

It can be assumed that if the Antonivskyi Bridge is blown up and a threat is created to Nova Kakhovka, then perhaps the Russian forces will decide to withdraw from Kherson. But so far, we do not see any prerequisites for this. They will try to hold their position in Kherson

But for now, there is no such danger. We do not see signs that mobilization is being prepared (Within a month. In Russia)

The situation in Mariupol is dire. It is practically impossible to unblock it now

If this war lasts a year, there will definitely be a need to call up reservists

We do not expect an offensive on Odesa (In the near future)

As is known, the Azov Regiment is located in Mariupol, which will be a huge problem for the Russian forces

Kyiv will never be captured